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OSCAR =MANN'S CONCEPT OF TIME 
INTRODUCTION 
In the foreword to the second edition of his book Christ and Tine, 
Oscar C011mAnn admits that this work is not intended to answer the 
questions raised by systematic theology. He goes on, to claim that the 
giving of such answers is not the real task of a New Testament scholar 
like himself, nor, in his opinion, should it be. In his own words: 
Is it not the most valuable service that the New Testament schol-
ar can render to the systematic theologian that he permits the 
questions that are not solved in the New Testament itself to stand 
as questions? And does not the real responsibility of the exegete 
in relation to systematic theology lie precisely in this limitation, 
so that his duty is to hand on these questions in the very form in 
which they are presented by the objective New Testament dater" 
In this book CuThnann has done the task of a New Testament scholar 
as he sees it and has, as far as possible, performed this "most valu-
able service" for the systematic theologian. However, such a service 
is also a challenge to the systematic theologian, the challenge to form,. 
ulate and to evaluate answers to the questions which have been handed 
on to him. In its own limited way, this paper is an attempt to meet 
this challenge. It is an attempt to understand Oullmaanis concept of 
time, to investigate the relationship between this concept and other 
theological questions to which Cullmann has addressed himself, and to 
determine whether or not this conception of time has implications which 
Cullman himself has not yet thoroughly explored. 
At the outset we must admit that Cullmann regards questions about 
the nature of time as ancillary to his primary concern, which, he tells 
us, is "the presentation of the Biblical redemptive history."2 Yet it 
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is precisely this point, the relationship between time and history, 
which is important for Cullmann's understanding of the nature of Heils-
geschichte. The three chapters of this paper will attempt to demonstrate 
that Cullman's conception of time is a factor which influences, even 
though it does not completely determine, the answers which he finds to 
other questions of biblical theology. 
First, however, the reader might be helped by a swift summary of 
what Callmann's understanding of the nature of time is. As far as he is 
concerned, man can understand time only in terms of its primitive Chris-
tian symbol, the line. 'The New Testament knows only the linear time 
concept of Today, Yesterday, and Tbmorrow; all philosophical reinter-
pretation and dissolution into timeless metaphysics is foreign to it.° 
In other words, part of Cullman's method is to describe time in terms 
which contrast it to the Greek cyclical conception of time, in which 
time is differentiated from a timeless Beyond, otherwise known as etern-
ity, For Wilma= there is no such thing as timelessness; eternity is 
the unlimited extension of the time-line into both the past and the fa. 
ture. This conception of eternity is not differentiated from time qual-
itatively, but in respect to the limitation of its extension. 'mat we 
call 'time' is nothing but a part, defined and delimited, by God, of 
this same unending duration of God's time.°4  
The above assertion is primarily based on a study of the New Test-
ament use of the word aion ("age"} which, according to Cullmann, shows 
us.that 'between everlastingly continuing time and limited time, the 
New Testament makes absolutely no difference in terminology.45 Another 
Greek word dealing with time and frequently used in the New Testament, 
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kairos, generally denotes a definite point of time with a fixed content, 
showing that it is possible for God to use time to accomplish His pur-
poses. According to Cullmann, the conception of time which tne New Test-
ament presents in terms of these two words is one of the "basic presupp- 
ositions of la Testament theoloor.06 Aside from these few fundament- 
als, however, Cullmann does not deal with tne nature of time Ilk, but 
only in its relation to other theological questions, some of which will 
be dealt with in the chapters of this paper. 
The use of a geometrical term in the titles of these three chapters 
is not based upon what Cullmann calls "the misconception that I 
have taken as my preconceived starting point a geometric figure,"7 It 
is assumed, without question that Cullmann is being methodologically hon-
est with his readers and with himself. However, Cullmann here cannot be 
denying that geometric figures are helpful in understanding his concept 
of time. He himself uses geometric figures in this book, (p. 82, p. 188) 
figures which are extremely helpful for making his position clear. Sim-
ilarly, the use of the term "linear" is an attempt to clarify our under-
standing of Cullmann's position, not to charge him with working from a 
preconceived notion of the nature of time. 
CHAP TER I 
THE LINEAR CONCEPT OF TIME AND =LEANN'S 
CONCEPT OF HEILSGESCHICHTE 
The relationship between history and biblical redemptive history, 
between Geschichte and Heilsaeschichte, is one of the most important 
issues confronting contemporary theologians. Some theologians attempt 
to deal with this problem by regarding the temporal and historical el-
ements of the Christian proclamation as a framework which must be re-
moved by the theologian in order for him to arrive at the central ker-
nel of the biblical message. This method is one of Ade-mythologizing" 
the Christian proclamation, to use the term of Rudolf Bultmann, one of 
the principal proponents of this process. It is this temporal and hist-
orical element° which Bultmann and others regard as mythological cover- 
ing, which Cull claimi is the actual center of the Christian proc-
lamation. It is important to see that CullmAnals disagreement with Bult-
mann on this point is not so much a matter of methodology as it is a 
question of the conclusions which he draws. Calm= too seeks to get 
at what is central in the biblical message and disclaims any biblicistic 
attitude which "treats all statements in the Bible as of equal worth."1  
He too maintains that certain aspects of the Bible are peripheral el-
ements (Rahmenelementen) which are not to be confused with the heart of 
the biblical message. However, what Callmann finds at the center of the 
biblical proclamation is that which Bultmann has rejected as unnecess-
ary husk, namely, the Christian conception of time and history. His own 
conclusion is: "The historical character of salvation, which Bultmann 
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regards as inacceptable to the modern mind, . . . is not a secondary 
element, but it is the essence of the thought of the New Testament." 
Bultmann also recognizes that the content of the central theme of the- 
ology is at the heart of his differences with Cull He makes this 
plain in his critique of Christ and Time, which will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
Oallmann distinguishes between two aspects of the Christian con-
ception of time and treats these two aspects separately in the first 
two sections of his book. On the one hand, he maintains that "salvation 
is bound to a continuous time process (fortlaufendes Zeitgeschehen) 
which embraces past, present, and fature."3 On the other hand, it is 
also his position "that all points of the redemptive line are related 
to the one historical fact at the mid-point, This fact is the death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ."1 This distinction, however, does not 
only deal with two aspects of the concept of Heilsaeschichte, It also 
implicitly supposes that there are two different ways of looking at the 
nature of time. 
Binding salvation to a continuous time process implies that the 
existence of this process is an essential aspect of both Heilsgeschichte  
and secular world history. Let us quickly review the steps by which 
Cull connects these two concepts so closely. Oullmann begins by an-
alyzing the two Greek words with a temporal connotation used most freq-
uently in the New Testament, kairos and aion. He finds that kairos bas-
ically deals with a definite point of time with a fixed content. In its 
theological aspect, kairos deals with "times that God in his sovereign 
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power has fixed and that therefore have a special significance in re-
lation to His plan of salvation.° The word aion, on the other hand, 
signifies a period of duration. This duration may be defined exaet4, 
but it may also be undefined and incalculable. From this second, unde-
fined use of aion, Cullmann draws the conclusion that "in the New Test-
ament field it is not time and eternity that stand opposed, but limited 
time and unlimited, endless tree. "6  On the basis of this understanding 
of the word, Cullmann distinguishes three kinds of duration, namely: 
(1) A duration of unending extension which is unlimited in both directions 
and is usually designated by the word "eternity," (2) that duration which 
is limited in both directions, by the Creation at the one end and by 
the Parousia at the other, and (3) durations which are limited in one 
direction but not in the other, specifically (a) the duration before 
the Creation and (b) the duration after the Parousia. 
After making this threefold division of the aiones, Cullmann goes 
on to make the inference that a linear conception of time is necessary 
if a meaningful distinction is to be made between the aion before the 
Creation and the one after the Parousia. He tells us: "all this can take 
place on in a time framework that continuously moves straight forward."7  
Therefore, for CuIlmann, time is something which not only has its own 
intrinsic value, but which also gives the events which occur in time 
their meaning and value. In his own words: 
This, however, means that the worth of an epoch of time does not 
consist in its relation to a timeless eternity; each epoch has 
its own meaning precisely as a portion of time. This meaning is 8  
recognized, however, only from the mid-point which itself iB time. 
It follows as a logical corollary of this assertion that, if time were 
not linear; salvation as it has been revealed to man would not be possible. 
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However, the assertion that time is essential to God's plan of sal-
vation and that the time of the aiones before the Creation and after the 
Parousia is qualitatively no different from the time of our own age also 
has implications for Cullmann's conception of the nature of God. By 
definition, the divine attribute of eternity cannot be understood by 
Cullmann in the sense of timelessness. Yet the eternity which he has de-
scribed as *the endless succession of the ages* still *is possible only 
as an attribute of God."9 Since, as we have already seen, (p. 2 mum) 
our time is merely a limited section of this limitless duration, it would 
seem to follow that in some respect our time is also an attribute of God. 
This would mean that God and time are not identical, but neither are 
they entirely separate entities. ihdlessly extended time as an attribute 
of God differs from time as men understand it in respect to the means 
by which God measures time. *God alone rules over time, for he alone 
can survey it in its entire extension, and measure it with measurea7which 
are . different from ours."]' Just as the timekeeper of a basketball 
game can manipulate the clock so that the team which is trailing its 
opponents has additional time in which to catch up, so God, in His sov-
ereign lordship over time, determines the duration of the different atones.  
This human comparison is not, of course, intended.to imply that God ex•. 
ercises this lordship in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 
. That which prevents the divine lordship over time from being arb-
itrary and capricious is itself a temporal event, namely the crucifixion, 
resurrection° and ascension of Jesus Christ. This historical fact is the 
mid-point to which all aspects of the redemptive line are related. As a 
historical fact this mid-point is in itself an essential part of the 
three aiones which Gullmann has distinguished. As a mid-point, however, 
Gullmann speaks of this event as a new division of time which is imposed 
upon the still continuing three-fold division."/' The word which Filson 
has translated as "impose" (uberschneiden) is perhaps more accurately 
rendered as "intersect" or "overlap." Nevertheless, God's use of this 
new division demonstrates that He can exercise his lordship over time 
in more than one way. He not only determines the duration of the atones; 
He also gives meaning to all aiones by filling a specific kairos with 
a specific content. From this it follows that something more than time 
itself is essential to redemptive history, namely, the meaning which 
God has given to the events of Holy Week. In this sense it is possible 
for Gallmann to speak of time as the framework (Rohmen) of Heilsgeschichte. 
This work of filling a specific kairos with a special content is 
ascribed. by Gullmann both to God the Father as He plans man's salvation 
and to God the Son, Who willingly assumes the role of the 'six:$:1 lhwh 
in order to effect this salvation, thus becoming the mid-point of Hails-
gesehichte. TWo passages from one of Gallmann's shorter works, The Re-
turn of add, should suffice to demonstrate more clearly what Cull-
mann means by calling time the framework of redemptive history. Speak-
ing of the Father's plan of salvation, Gullmann tells us that *time is 
not a reality hostile to God, but, on the contrary, the means of grace 
by which God intends man's salvation.R12 As the other side of the coin, 
Cullman tells us that Jesus "inserts his own death into the framework 
of the history of salvation. "13 Finally, in another brief essay, He ft 
Comes After 141,W11mann mentions both of these aspects of time in one 
short sentence which summarizes God's plan of salvation. He writes: 
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"This plan is, on the one hand, entirely Christocentric, on the other, 
completely bound up with its unfolding in time."14 Here it is implied 
that time is both a means of grace and the framework for the Christ...event. 
If time is an attribute of God, and if the central event of the bib-
lical redemptive history is completely bound up with its unfolding in 
time, does it follow that for Cullman Heilsgeschichte and world hist-
ory are indistinguishable? This seems to be one of the questions raised 
by Bultmann's critique of Christ gam& Bultmann would give an affirm-
ative answer to this question. As far as he is concerned, Cullmann has 
eliminated any meaningful distinction between redemptive history and 
secular history. In Bultmann's own words: 
I cannot see that for him "history" in the phrase "history of sal-
vation" has any different meaning from what it has in "history of 
the world," nor can I understand how the Old Testament history of 
salvation as history is in principle different from the history lq 
of the people ofISta617..thakis 4184;i :open to the profane historian. 
The subsequent pages of 2dltmann's critique reveal that there is an ass-
umption concerning the nature of time which is basic to his criticisms 
of Cullmann. This assumption is that a distinction must always be made 
between existence within time and the temporality of existence itself. 
For Bultmann "temporal existence means to exist in constantly new de-
cisions, in constantly new encounters, whether with men or with destiny.-- .16 
It is this type of temporality which, for Bultmann, has been eliminated 
for the Christian by the event of the cross. Thus for Bultmann the cross 
is the decisive event of salvation history, but not because it is bound 
up with its unfolding in time, as 0: alumna maintains. It is decisive 
because it eliminates, for the person who has died and risen with Christ, 
such aspects of temporality as temptation through suffering and death. 
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For Bultmann time itself is gay: the framework for Heilsgeschichte, not 
a process which has been transformed by God into a means of grace. 
How valid is Bultmann's criticism? His main problem seems to be 
that he is looking for the distinction between Geschichte and Heilsgeseb-
ichte precisely where Gullmann maintains; that this distinction cannot 
and dare not be found, in its temporality, For Bultmann Heilsgeschichte  
eliminates temporality for the believing Christian. If it does not, it 
is not Heilsgeschichte. Cullman does not make this distinction between 
temporal existence and an existence within time. Therefore, although 
Cullman does recognize that a distinction can be made between history 
and myth, he maintains that the time-line of biblical redemptive hist.. 
ory which unites them is more essential to the Christian conception of 
salvation than is the criterion of factual verifiability which separates 
them. "The demonstration that a myth is not 'historical' does not imply 
that the happening whose account it preserves is not Itemporal."17 By 
this statement Gullmann indicates how highly he values the involvement 
of a linear time-process with redemptive history. Until. Bultmann learns 
to appreciate the high estimate which Gullmann places upon the time-
process, or Cullmann modifies his position that temporality is indispens-
able to Heilsgeschichte, these two distinguished theologians will not 
be discussing this question upon common ground. 
If, then, Cullman does not place the distinction between Geschichte  
and Heilsgeschichte in the temporality of the former and the non-temp-
orality of the latter, how is the distinction to be made? Ocillmann seems 
to make a distinction by means of the concept of representation. For 
Gullmann representation (Stellvertretune is the principle according to 
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which a double movement along the redemptive line takes place. In the 
Old Testament the movement is one of progressive reduction, from mankind 
to the people of Israel to the remnant of Israel to the One, Christ. 
Christ, as the center of the redemptive line,, becomes the Redeemer, both 
of mankind and of the entire creation. In the New Testament the movement 
is one of progressive advance, from Christ to the Church to the redeemed 
creation of the new heaven and the new earth. Here again it is important 
to see how vitally the linear process of time itself is connected, with 
this principle. As Cullman puts it: 
The thought of election and representation makes its appearance 
on in connection with the development that takes place on the 
time line which we have described. It is not possible kapeak in 18 the abstract concerning these central Primitive Christian concepts.  
Since Christ id the midpoint of both processes, this passage is a re-
minder that the difference between Geschichte and Heilsgeschichte cannot 
be temporal. If there is any distinction, it is between those who have 
been elected as representative of all creation and those who have not. 
The former are included both in the sphere of Geschichte and in the sphere 
of Heilsgeschichte, while the latter are included only in the sphere of 
Geschichte. At the creation, before the principle of representation be• 
gan to operate, these two spheres were identical; at the creation of 
the new heaven and the new earth, when_the principle of representation 
shall have been completed, the two spheres will once again be identical. 
Thus it can be seen that Cullman combines a theological with a spatial 
concept in order to make a distinction between Hellsgeschichte and Ge-
schichte at any given segment of the temporal process. The implications 
of this picture of the relationship between space and time will be treat-
ed in a later chapter of this paper. 
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One more question should be dealt with in this chapter. It is raised 
by the last quotation which has been cited, in which Cullmann tells us 
that it is impossible to speak in the abstract concerning primitive Chris-
tian concepts. The context of this assertion indicates that by "in the 
abstract" Oullmann means "without taking into account that segment of 
the time-process during which a salvation-event occurs.* The question 
might be raised here: How is it possible to speak or write about any 
event of the past without speaking about it in the abstract. that is, 
during a segment of the time-line other than that irrepeatable segment 
during which the event actually took placeirlb put this question another 
ways How can we discern our own relationship to the rest of the redemp-
tive line if it is impossible to abstract ourselves from our own involve-
ment in the linear process of Heilsgeschichtel For that matter, how can 
Cullmann draw us a picture of the entire salvation-line without abstract-
ing himself from his own involvement in a certain segment of it? This 
is a problem which is raised by Cullman:11s insistence that time is an 
irreversible, irrepeatable process by means of which God acts to redeem 
a fallen creation. From at least one point of view, the answer to these 
questions is a negative one, that it is impossible to picture time apart 
from our own psychic involvement in it. Although he does not seam to be 
speaking to CullmannIs viewpoint directly, Canon Jean Mouroux: has given 
clear articulation to the position that man cannot picture time as Cull-
mann has done. In his recent book, The Mystery of Ttme, Mauro= main-
tains, along with Augustine, that the present is the means by which the 
psyche measures all time. "The present is, then, the very ground of ex-
istence through which past and future are actualized and time engendered."19 
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Therefore, Hour= concludes, "it is Arbil() to try to picture time as 
a relationship between different successive things, events arranged lin-
early and arising irreversibly without past or fUtute.°20  
This assertion cannot be placed in direct contrast to Omllmann's 
position, because it is taken from a chapter in which Mouroux is dig-
cussing "human time," that is, time.as it is structured by the human 
psyche. Eburoux, like Cullmann, realizes that God measures time in a 
vastly different manner than do human beingsi Callmann4ilawever. does 
not attempt to answer the questions raised in the previous paragraph 
by means of this distinction between divine and human methods of meas-
uring time. He maintains that the formulations by which the Church ex.. 
pressed her understanding of the Christ-event are in themselves Hails-
geschichte, another aspect of God's use of time as a means of grace by 
which he brings salvation to people. In this way he gives an indirect 
answer to these questions. An example of how Cullmann places both event 
and formulation within the same process of Heilsgeschichte can be found 
in The Christology of the la Testament, where he tells us: 
But if the process of arriving at Christological understanding 
took place in early Christianity in connection with these ventral 
events of the first century, we can4ay that this process itself 
belongs within the Heilsgeschichte. 
From this assertion it would seem to follow that every formulation 
which attempts to understand fully "those central events of the first 
century," from the ecumenical creeds. through our Lutheran confessions, 
right down to the latest article in a theological journal (or even the 
latest paper by an undergraduate seminarian) are part of the process 
which "itself belongs within the Heilsgeschichte." In this way it can 
be seen that the importance of the primitive Christian conception of 
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time has led Callmann to de-emphasize the distinction between fbrmula- 
tion and event, between revelation and its content, a distinction which 
is of great importance to many contemporary theologians, 
CHAPTER II 
THE LINEAR CONCEPT OF TIME AND CULLMANN'S 
UNDERSTANDING OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
Let us quickly summarize the three ages which, according to Cull-
mann, are recognized by the New Testament. There is the age before the 
Creation, the "present" age, which lies between the Creation and the 
End, and the "coming" age, in which the first creation will be replaced 
by the new creation? These three ages are intersected or overlapped by 
the mid-point of redemptive history, the crucifixion and resurrection 
of Christ, which itself is a temporal event of the "present" age. from 
the point of view of Heilsgeschichtes this mid-point is the kairos to 
which all of the other kairoi of the redemptive process are related and 
from which they derive their own meaning and value. This mid-point, how-
ever, is not merely a means of dividing the resent" age into eras des-
ignated by the phrases "before Christ" and "year of our Lord." This mid-
point is also that which inaugurates the "coming" age and creates what 
Cullmann calls "the temporal tension between present and future."2 It 
is in the atmosphere of this tension, according to Cullmann, that the 
ethics of the New Testament were formulated and it is in this same at-
mosphere that they are lived by God's people today. 
The fact that this "coming" age has been inaugurated does not in 
itself, of course, create this tension. What creates the tension is that 
this "present" age, also a segment of the "time framework that contin-
uously moves straight forward," (cf. p.6 ain) has not yet been com-
pleted. In this sense it is possible for Cullmann to speak of a nehron. 
16 
ological dualism," in that two segments of the linear time framework 
Overlap each other. Cullmann describes the early Christian belief in 
this chronological dPaliRm in the following manner: 
This is the conviction that, on the one hand, in Christ the end 
is already fulfilled, and that nonetheless the consummation is 
still in the future, since the framework of the present world 
still endures. We shall see that this dualism has al ead$ fouid 
expression in the primitive conception of the State.)  
It will also be seen that this dna14SM finds expression in the primitive 
Christian conception of individual ethics. 
first, however, we have to ask whether or not there is a tension 
in GullmannIs own thinking about the nature of time, a tension between 
his description of a chronological dilAltsm and his conception of time 
as a linear process which continuously moves straight forward. It is 
legitimate to wonder whether there might be a chronological sequence 
in which these positions are proposed by Cullmann. If such a sequence 
should be detected, then it might be inferred that further scholarship 
had caused Cullman to modify or even to change his understanding of 
the nature of time. An initial reading of Cullmann's works might give 
the impression that there is such a sequence. The earlier workd seem 
to emphasize the linear nature of time, while later efforts seem to 
stress his idea of a chronological dualism. However, a closer scrutiny 
of the material shows that this generalization is not completely valid. 
Already in The Return of Christ Cullmann finds it possible to tell us 
that "in Jesus, but only in Him, the temporal tension which exists be-
tween the present age and the age to come is already abolished, although 
his work continues to develop in time."4 This reference indicates that 
the idea of a temporal tension between the aiones was a part of C011mAnnts 
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picture of the nature of time even before he began to investigate areas 
such as the primitive Christian attitude toward the state. 
How then is it possible for two segments of the linear time process 
to overlap each other? Cullmann, of course, does not address himself 
directly to this question, which is in keeping with his self-limitation 
to the role of a New Testament scholar and his avoidance of speculative 
problems concerning the nature of time. Perhaps a geographical illustra-
tion will help us to answer this question which Cullmann has handed on 
to us. Let us imagine that there are three towns located on Route 821 
Parma toward the east, Strongsville ten miles west of Parma, and Berea 
ten miles west of Strongsville. A Parma resident starts out in his car 
with the goal of going to Berea. It is legitimate to speak of himaas 
being on the Road from Parma to Berea. Our traveller passes through the 
town of Strongsville, which intersects the Road from Parma to Berea. 
What Road is he on now? The only thorough answer which can be given is: 
"He is on the Road from Parma to Berea and he is on the Road from Strong-
sville to Berea and he is at a specific point on Route 822 In an analog-
ous way, it is Cullmann's position that the world is in the age which 
began at the creation and will end at the Parousia and it is in the "com-
ing' age which began with the coming in the flesh of Jesus Christ and 
it is bound up with a specific point of the time process. It should be 
noted that in each case the third designation does not depend upon the 
first two for its validity. Our traveller would still be at a specific 
point on Route 82, even if the three towns should suddenly be wiped off 
the map. Likewise, the world would still be bound up with a specific 
point of the time process, even if the events which
. 
 inaugurate and term. 
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irate the various ages had never happened. I believe that this illus-
tration is perhaps the most efficient way to do justice to Galina:anis 
understanding of the present position of the world in relation to at-
schichte Heilsgeschichte, and the temporal process. 
At this point the objection might be resurrected that Bultmann 
was right after all, that Cullmann does blur all meaningful distinction 
between Geschichte and Heilsgeschichte. In order to give this objection 
its second burial, it is necessary for us to turn to the geometrical 
illustration which Cullman uses to help explain his understanding of 
this present era of chronological dualism. Cullmann has designated this 
era as that of "the complete lordship of Christ," by which phrase he is 
attempting to express the idea "that Christ from the time of his res-
urrection is head of the Church and likewise head of all visible and 
invisible beings."5 Because of this lordship there is a close relation-
ship between redemptive process and general world process, but they are 
not identical. Cullmann explains his geometric illustration in the foll-
owing manner: 
We must rather conceive two concentric circles, whose common 
center is Christ. The entire circular surface is the reign of 
Christ; the inner circle is the Chur
c
h, the surface lying between 
the two circumferences is the world. 
The fact that the smaller of these circles, the Church, keeps expanding 
in area illustrates the truth that in the present era the movement of 
theprineilite..:., of representation is one of progressive advance. 
The criterion which determines whether or not a person belongs to 
the inner circle of the Church or only to the outer portion of the circle 
of the world is whether or not that person is aware, by faith, of the 
lordship of Christ over the whole world. This concept, the knowledge 
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of Christ's lordship, is fundamental to Cullmann's understanding of the 
relationship between the Church and the world. Speaking of the members 
of the Church, Cullmann writes: 
By this faith they know concerning Christ's rule over them and 
over the entire world. The rest of the visible and invisible world 
is also ruled by Christ, but for the time being does not know it. 
. . Because the Church alone knows of this brios Christos, it 
must preach this lordship to those who, without knowing it, ge 
also subjected to it and fulfill the function assigned to it,' 
From this passage the impression might be drawn that Cullman:Os concept 
of faith is ratter one-sided, with all of the emphasis being on faith 
as the intellectual awareness of the lordship of Christ. This impression 
might be strengthened if some of the nuances of the German word wissen, 
which Cullmann uses here, were to be taken into consideration. On the 
other hand, this impression should be balanced by taking into account 
Cullmann's contention that many of the early Christians were willing to 
suffer martyrdom because of this "knowledge" of the lordship of Christ. 
Whether this description of faith places too much emphasis upon 
its intellectual aspect or not, it is important to see that this knowl-
edge of the lordship of Christ is not only a knowledge of the spatial 
area of this lordship; it is also a knowledge of the temporal extent 
of the rule of Christ. Phrther, it is a knowledge by the individual that 
both of these aspects of Christ's lordship apply to him personally. Per-
haps our geographical illustration can again be used to make these points 
clearer. Our traveller once again starts out from Parma to go to Berea. 
There is no speed limit posted before he passes through Strongsville. 
After he passes through Strongsville, however, there is a posted speed 
limit. Whether our traveller sees the sign or not, he is on a road which 
is under the "lordship" of the posted speed limit. However, knowing or 
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not knowing this law will make a difference, all other human factors 
being set aside for the moment, in whether our traveller belongs to that 
group of motorists which is keeping the law, or to that group which is 
breaking it. Farther, our motorist must combine his knowledge of the 
speed limit with his knowledge that he is on that part of the linear 
process of Route 82 which lies between Strongsville and Berea in order 
to realize that the !lordship" of the speed limit apiblies to him person-
ally. It must, of course, be remembered that, both in Cullman's position 
and in our illustration, these three factors can only be separated con-
ceptually and not in their actual occurrence. 
From this estimation of the position of the Christian in relation 
to Christ, in relation to the world, and in relation to the ongoing time 
process, Cullmann's understanding of what the ethical stance and attitude 
of the Christian ought to be flows in a cogent and coherent manner. Be-
cause the Christ-event has caused this age to be one of temporal tension, 
the attitude of the Christian toward the world is based neither on the 
principle of world affirmation nor on the principle of world denial, but 
on a combination of both principles. Cullmann describes this combination 
in the following manner: 
The believer lives in a world concerning which he knows that it 
will pass away, but he knows that it still has its divinely willed 
place in the framework of redemptive history and is ruled by Christ. 
In so far as he knows that it will pass away, he denies it: in so 
far as he knows that it is the divinely willed framework of the 
present stage of redemptive history, he affirms it.°  
Cullmann finds one example of this combination of principles in 
the attitude of the primitive Christian community toward the secular 
state. In so far as the state is something that will pass away, the 
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Christians deny it. They do not use the secular courts to settle their 
intra-community disputes, as St. Paul reminds the Corinthians in the 
sixth chapter of his first epistle to them. In so far as the state is 
the means by which God permits these secular powers to control the frame-
work of redemptive history, the Christians affirm it. they obey the in-
junction of Paul to "be subject to the governing authorities."9 Cullmann 
correctly points out that, in spite of the exegetical pot-shots to which 
it has been subjected, his interpretation of the exousiai in Rem. 13,1 
as the invisible powers of the present age does not determine CuLlmann's 
understanding of the Pauline attitude toward the state. "It by no means 
introduces a radically new understanding of the Pauline conception of 
the Stateol° is his reminder to his critics. Rather, as has been shown, 
Cullmannis understanding of this problem stems from his picture of this 
age as one of temporal tension and chronological dualism for the Christian. 
When, then, is the Church to oppose the state? According to Cull-
mann, this is to be done whenever the state exceeds the role which God 
has assigned to it in the present stage of redemptive history. For ex-
ample, when the state proclaims the total lordship of its human head, 
it is claiming for itself the role of Christ. Such claims nust be denied 
by the Church. That is why faithful Christians of the first centuries 
would go to the lions before they would confess "Krrios Kaisar." That 
is why any totalitarian state is in principle incompatible with the proc-
lamation of the primitive Church that "Jesus is Lord." Therefore, accord-
ing to Cullmann, the Church, while it loyally affirms the state and rend-
ers to it everything necessary for its existence, is at the same time 
always ready to deny any claims that the state might make in areas be- 
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yond its divinely willed limits, and to warn the state that such claims 
are satanic.*Tb bring the wheel of his thought fail circle, it should 
be noted that, as far as Call:mann is concerned, the Church will 
taro this attitude toward the state only so long as it remains aware 
of its own position in the process of redemptive history,. His own summ-
ary of the situation is: 
The Church will fulfill this assignment if it remains faith4U1 to 
the fundamental eschatological attitude of the New Testament. It 
could be shown how in the course of history the Church has always 
assumed a false attitude toward the State when it has forgotten  
that the pusent time is already fulfillment, but not yet con-
summation. 
The same combination of principles, neither world-affirmation nor 
world-denial, also applies to the stance of the individual Christian 
over against the things of this world. Cullmann uses the exhortations 
of Paul in I Cor. 7,29-31 as an illustration of how this combinatiOn 
of principles is to be applied. He intimates that many exegetes empha-
size only the negative conclusions in this passage, in which the Christ-
ians are urged to live "as though they were not rejoicing" and "as though 
they had no goods." Cullmann balances this accent by reminding his read• 
ers that the words "as though" show us clearly that the Christians still 
did rejoice, that they still did buy and sell the things of this world. 
That the individual Christian will practice this combination of prin-
ciples, however, depends upon his being aware of his present role in 
the redemptive process. According to Callmann, such an awareness of his 
present role cannot take place unless the Christian is also aware of his 
relationship to the mid-point of the process, the Christ-event which 
occurred in past time. "Our personal life is anchored in the time line 
of the Christ-event, which comprehends past, present, and ftture."12 
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On this basis, but only on this basis, can such biblical expressions 
as "to die with Christ," "to be glorified with Christ," and "Christ lives 
in me" be interpreted in a non-mystical manner. !The, dependence of the 
individual life on a process which unfolds in time"13 is, according to 
Cullmann, what distinguishes the participation of the Christian in the 
Body of Christ from the participation in a timeless myth by the follower 
of a, Greek mystery religion. For the mystic, participation in the myth 
or in the god which he seeks takes place beyond time; for the Christian, 
participation in the Body of Christ takes place in the present because 
the past has become real for him, yet the past remains distinct from 
the present. Cullman's understanding of Baptism illustrates both aspects 
of this participation in Christ's Body: 
Through Baptism . there becomes real for the individual, on 
the one side, the "dying with" and the "rising with" Christ, and 
so the participation in what occurred in the past, and on the 
other dide, the impartation of the Holy Spirit, and so the par-
ticipatiga in the redemptive occurrence of the present and the 
future.14 
The gifts of the Holy Spirit are given to the Christian for the 
service of the Church, the present unfolding of the redemptive process. 
This means that the service of each and every Christian finds its value 
in redemptive history, in the indicative of the present and complete 
lordship of Christ. It is in this indicative that all New Testament im-
peratives are anchored. These imperatives are not to be taken as the 
setting forth of general rules, but as the giving of "concrete instruc-
tions for concrete cases."? 
 The principle by which this indicative of 
Christ's lordship is to be applied to these concrete cases is the prin-
ciple of love. "The imperative of love of neighbor grows out of redemp-
tive history's indicative of the love of God for us.016 When and haw 
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this application is to be made, however, is not left to the subjective 
judgment of the individual Christian. One of the gifts of the Holy Spirit 
to each Christian is that of "testing," which Cullmann defines as "the 
capacity of forming the correct Christian ethical judgment at each given 
moment."17 Cullmann's understanding of the relationship between individ-
ual Christian ethics and redemptive history can perhaps be summarized 
in this manner: Because the Christian, a member of the Body of Christ, 
knows where the'Body has been and where It is going, he is able to have 
a proper attitude toward the things of this world, to have a wife, for 
example, as though he did not. Because the Christian knows where he is 
right now, he is able to apply the indicative of Christ's lordship to 
his own immediate problems and situations. 
This brief summary of Cullmann's understanding of New Testament 
ethics should suffice to show that for him this position is closely 
connected with the primitive Christian conception of time as a linear 
process. In evaluating Cullmann's understanding of New Testament eth-
ics, it is legitimate to ask whether this dependence upon the linear
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concept of time is really necessary in order for Cullmann to arrive at 
these conclusions. For example, does it require an understanding of the 
linear process of time in order to realize that the seventh chapter of 
First Corinthian's does not give general rules but "concrete instructions 
for concrete cases?" Could not this same insight be obtained merely by 
taking seriously the first phrase of this chapter, "now concerning the 
matters about which you wrote?" Is it necessary to maintain that the 
New Testament concept of time is linear in order to be able to say that 
"the imperative of love of neighbor grows out of redemptive history's 
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indicative of the love of God for us?" Have not many exegetes come to / 
a similstr conclusion without investigating the biblical concept of time 
or coming to any conclusions about the nature of time? Is CUllmann per-
haps more of a systematician than he himself realizes? Answering all 
of these questions in the affirmative does not, of course, invalidate 
any of Callmaan's conclusions concerning the nature of New Testament 
ethics. It does, however, point out that Cullman's approach to this 
problem, by way of the biblical concepts of time and history, is not 
the only path by which to arrive at his conclusions, and may not be the 
shortest, most direct route. 
Our main concern, however, is with Cull  man's concept of time. It 
is now necessary to evaluate that aspect of time which Cullmann's studies 
in the area of ethics have caused him to emphasize more heavily, namAly 
the concepts of chronological dualism and temporal tension. If the chron-
ological dualism consists of the overlapping of two segments of the 
linear time process, where is the temporal tension located? Is this 
tension something which exists between events themselves, between the 
salvation events by which Christ has already fulfilled and established 
his lordship and the events of secular history which, as part of the 
framework of this present age, have not yet passed away? This is what 
Cullmann seems to *ay. There is, however, an alternative location for 
this temporal tension, namely the psyche of the Christian, who by God'S 
grace has been drawn into the redemptive process through his participa-
tion in the Body by Which Christ exercise His lordship, but who has 
not been taken out of this present world. Mouroux is a convincing pro-
ponent of this concept of temporal tension. Speaking of the individual 
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Christian, he tells uss 
His psyche is the battleground of an inevitable tension. By his 
activities as a member of the human race, he lives in cosmic time. 
By faith he lives in the Church's salvation-time. Insofar as his 
psyche laLaathe world, salvation-time seems to be inserted in 
cosmic time; insofar as his psyche sees by faith, cosmic time 
seems to be enveloped in salvation-time. 
If it could be shown that what Cullmann calls the "coming" age is 
identical to what Mouroux calls "salvation-time," and that what Cu].]... 
mann calls this "present" age is what Mouroux calls "cosmic time," then 
it would be much easier to understand what Oullmann means by the term 
"temporal tension." This temporal tension could then be explained as 
the individual Christian's subjective realization that he is 0:=1, ,iustus  
et pecoator. Cullmarns, however, does not write about the redemptive pro-
cess from this subjective viewpoint. The passage from Mauro= cited 
above emphasizes how, at a given moment in the present, salvation-time 
envelops cosmic time for an individual Christian. Cullmann, however, 
would maintain that the "envelopment" (he does not use this exact word) 
of the world process by the salvation process does not actually occur 
until the end of the world process, because this "envelopment" is it-
self a temporal process, the process which has previously been described 
as the progressive advance of the movement of the principle of repre-
sentation. "The world process has already begun to enter again into the 
redemptive process without, however, being as yet identical with it. 
. at the end . . . the redemptive history again becomes world hist-
ory,"19 is the way that Cullmann expresses this idea. Cullmann, however, 
does not really make clear whether the distinction between redemptive 
process and world process is ontological or conceptual. Some passages 
seem to imply one view; some of them seem to imply the other. Unless 
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Cullmann should address himself to this question more specifically, his 
readers will only be able to speculate as to the precise manning and 
location of what Oullmann calls "the temporal tension between present 
and fUture." Wie problem can be both simplified and complicated by a 
study of Cullmann's picture of the events which will end ibis tension. 
Such a study is the subject of this paper's third chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
THE LINEAR CONCEPT OF TIME AND CULLMANNIS DESCRIPTION 
OF THE END OF THIS PRESENT AGE 
There are two major themes in CullmannIs description of the end 
of this present age which are related to his concept of time. The first 
of these themes is his treatment of the doctrine of the resurrection, 
which has stimulated reaction in many theological circles. The second 
of these themes is the distinction which Callmann makes between the 
kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of God, a distinction which has not 
provoked as much theological reaction as it deserves. As these two themes 
are studied in this third chapter, perhaps it will be seen that they 
are helpful for tying together some of the loose ends of the previous 
chapters. Space does not permit us to connect these two themes to each 
other, or to treat either of them exhaustively. They will be studied 
here only as they relate to CullmannIs concept of time. 
"The Christian belief in the resurrection, as distinct from the 
Greek belief in immortality, is tied to a divine total process imply-
ing deliverance."1 With these words Cullmann connects the New Testament 
teachings concerning the resurrection with the New Testament concept 
of time. At the same time, GaLlmann tells us that the resurrection "is 
a new creation of matter, an incorruptible matter."2 Therefore, from 
the point of view of the resurrection, chronological tension consists 
in the fact that in the resurrection of Christ the new creation has al-
ready been inaugurated, but will not be consummated until the creation 
of the new heaven and the new earth, which is to take place at the end 
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of this age. The term "end," Callmann tells us, "is to be taken liter_ 
ally, that is, temporally.° from this premise follows Callmannes asser-
tion that "those who have died in Christ, even as dead, do not yet be-
long in the future stage of redemptive history, but in the present stage." 
From this assertion there follows a description of the "interim state" 
of the dead in Christ which helps us to understand Cullmann's concept 
of temporal tension. In his own words: 
We wait and the dead wait. Of course the rhythm of time may be 
different for them than for the living; and in this way the in-
terim time may be shortened for them. . . this expression to 
sleep, compels us to the view that for the dead another time-
consciousness exists, that of the "sleepipg." But that does not 
mean that the dead are not still in time: 
That there are two time-consciousnesses within the temporal tension 
clearly implies that temporal tension is not only a result of the Chris-
tiallts subjective realization that he belongs to two different ages. Tem-
poral tension is also found in the objective fact that the new creation 
of a spiritual body takes place at at least two different chronological 
points of the present age. It has taken place in the resurrection of 
Christ and it will take place for all men at the end of this present 
age. 
When Calmat= describes the nature of this new creation, however, 
he clouds his description of the New Testament concept of time somewhat. 
In describing this new creation, Callmann writes: 
Then only for the first time there will be nothing but Spirit, 
nothing but the power of life, for then death will be destroyed 
with finality. Then there will be a new substance for all things 
visible. Instead of the fleshly matter there appears the spirit-
ual, that is, Instead of corruptible matter there appears the 
incorruptible. 
This description of the new creation raises some problems from the sys-
tematician's point of view. First, that the newness of the new creation 
30 
consists of its incorruptibility is based on the premise that the corrupt-
ibility and death of this present creation are caused by sin. This prem-
ise is explicitly set forth by Oullmann earlier in this essay.? Since 
this is the case, does the assertion that "there will be a new substance  
for all things visible" imply that the substance of this present age 
will be completely destroyed? If this is true, where is the continuity 
between our present soma and our resurrection soma? from the context of 
this assertion, however, it is evident that what Oullmana means to say 
is that our mortal body will be "transformed" into a spiritual body. 
Then, however, he cannot speak of a new bodily "substance" being cre-
ated, at least not in the usual sense of that term, because the Spirit.. 
created quality of incorruptibility is related to man in the same manner 
as is the sin created quality of corruptibility. The dangers of ident-
ifying sin and human substance have been clearly set forth in our Luth-
eran confessions8 and do not need to be repeated. 
A second problem raised by this description of the new creation 
is the dilemma WPM by the question "is time itself one of the things 
which will have to be re-created at the new creation?" If it is, then 
the endless time-line cannot be an attribute of God, as Coulann claims 
that it is, because the time of this present age will have been found 
to be something corruptible. However, if time is not re-created at the 
new creation, in what sense can it be said that "all things visible" 
will be re-created? Designating something as *visible" implies that it 
has spatial qualities. Designating these visible things a "matter," even 
if this noun is qualified by the adjective .!spiritual," that is, created 
by the Spirit, implies that these visible, spatial things can be described 
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in the categories of the physical sciences. "This is certainly not the 
Greek sense of bodiless Ideal119 Cullmann tells us, speaking of the spirit-
uality of the new creation. If time is not re-created along with the 
space of all things visible, then it follows that time is independent 
of our present physical space. For most contemporary physicists this imp-
lication is just as unacceptable as are the other "necessarily outmoded 
framework elements" of the "primitive world view of the Bible" which, 
Cullmann tells us, "do not touch the kernel of the matter. "i° Sir James 
Jeans summarizes this viewpoint of many contemporary physicists in these 
words; 
The physical theory of relativity suggests, although without ab-
solute1y.tcoficlusive proof, that physical space and physical time 
have no separate and independent existences; they seem more likely 
to be abstractions or selections from something more coplex, 
namely a blend of space and time which comprises both.'l 
Jeans does go on to restrict the application of this suggestion to what 
he calls "man-sized physics" and suggests the possibility that modern 
astronomy will discover a way in which nature itself divides the space. 
time continuum into space and'time. 
It goes without saying that we do not intend to put this dilemma 
to God. To do so would be presumptuous and impudent. When this dilemma 
is put to Cullmann, however, it illustrates the difficulties in which 
Cullmann becomes involved when he maintains that some aspects of the 
primitive Christian world-view, their conceptions of time and history, 
are "basic presuppositions of all New Testament theologrowhile other 
aspects of this world-view are not. This difficulty raises the question 
of whether some, all, or any of our basic presuppositions have to be 
the same as those of the biblical writers in order for us to arrive at 
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the same theological conclusions. This question is at the innermost 
heart of Cullmann's differences with Bultmann. It is basic to their 
other differences which have been treated in this paper. All that can 
be done here, however, is to point out how important this difference 
is. An attempt to resolve it cannot be made now. Until a theologian has 
come to a conclusive position on this question , his evaluation of Cull. 
mann's concept of time ought, in fairness both to Cullmann and to him-
self, to remain suspended. 
Another theme which is part of Cullmann's picture of the end of 
this present age is the distinction which he makes between the kingdom 
of Christ and the kingdom of God. The kingdom of Christ is associated 
with His role as a Mediator, which means that it will end at the con. 
summation of this present age at the new creation, since a Mediator 
will no longer be needed. The exegetical base upon which Cullmann main. 
tains this position is somewhat narrower than those upon which most of 
his other insights are founded. It is virtually limited to one explicit 
passage, I Cor. 15,28, which speaks of the Son becoming subject to the 
Father at the end, clearly implying the termination of what Cullmann 
calls the kingdom of Christ. In general, contemporary exegesis of this 
passage agrees with Cullmann that it refers to the end of Christ's role 
as a Mediator. However, one commentary reminds us that "the passage is 
a summary of mysteries which our present knowledge does not enable us 
to explain and which our present faculties, perhaps, do not enable us 
to understand.u13 Cullmann, however, sheds some light on these myster. 
ies by connecting them with the New Testament understanding of time. 
Cullmann admits that the distinction between these two kingdoms is not 
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very explicit in the New Testament. He attributes this to the chrono-
logical dualism by which the coming age of the new creation has been 
inaugurated before the present age has been completed. This is what 
makes it possible for Jesus, even before His death, to see Satan cast 
down from heaven. (Luke 10,17) Mien he distinguishes between these two 
kingdoms, Cullmann tells us that: 
the chronological differentiation between them is unequivocally 
implicit in the New Testament. In substance the Regnum Christi 
is no,more separate from the kingdom of God the Father than the 
Son is separate from the Father, but fm the point of view of 
time it represents a power of its own. 
This passage does not only illuminate Cullmaanss distinction be-
tween these two kingdoms; it also sheds light upon his understanding 
of the New Testament concept of time and the use which he makes of this 
understanding in his other studies. Here Cullmann ascribes to time the 
power to differentiate that which would otherwise remain undifferentiated, 
namely the content of these two kingdoms. In some respect, therefore, 
time is not part of this content, but exists independently of it. Of 
what does the content of these kingdoms consist? Does it consist of 
the total universe over which this kingship is exercised, or does it 
consist only in the truth that kingship is exercised? If the content 
of these kingdoms is the total universe, then time and space are sep-
arated by Cullmann in a way that again involves him in a contradiction 
from the viewpoint of contemporary physics. This problem once more stems 
from Cullmannss attempt to distinguish between aspects of the primitive 
world-view which are essential to biblical theology and aspects which 
are not. If the content of these kingdoms is the truth that kingship 
is exercised by God, then the scientific and philosophical problems of 
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the relationship between space and time no longer have any bearing on 
our evaluation of Cullmann's concept of time. This assertion follows 
from the premise that the Christian apprehends the truth of divine king- 
ship by faith, not by scientific evidence. Therefore the time by which 
this kingship is divided into two kingdoms is also a matter of faith 
rather than sight. 
For Cullmann, then, making the primitive Christian conception of 
time a basic presupposition of all New Testament theology offers the 
contemporary Christian a possible way of integrating the primitive con.. 
cept of time held by the New Testament authors with his own world-view. 
He can accept, by faith, the primitive Christian concept of time and 
reject current philosophical insights on this subject to the extent that 
they conflict with the primitive Christian views. Tb do this, however, 
would put a different skandalon, the linear conception of time, in the 
place of the offensive significance of the temporal event of Good Fri— 
day. The offense of the cross does consist, in part, of its decisive, 
once-for-all character, as Cullmann so aptly points out. This may very 
well have been the chief way in which the cross was a stumbling block 
to the people of that era. Does not, however, the main offense of the cross 
consist in its condemnation of human pride and self-righteousness? Is 
it not more difficult for man to believe that his sins are serious enough 
to make the whole process of salvation necessary than to believe that 
the event of the cross is tne mid-point of this process? Here Cullmann's 
stress on the importance of the linear concept of time has led him to 
over-emphasize one aspect of the offense of the cross at the expense 
of other aspects of this concept, again showing that perhaps he is more 
of a systematician than he himself supposes. 
CONCLUSION 
At4his point it is necessary to recognize that Callmann has been 
analyzed and criticized from points of view other than those presented 
here. James Barr, for example, in his Biblical Words for time, crit-
icizes the method of lexical study upon which, he claims, Cullmann bases 
most of his findings. This method rests, Barr tells us, on "the assump-
tion that biblical language, in its grammatical mechanisms or in its 
lexical stock, will somehow surely and naturally reflect, or correspond 
to, or cohere with, biblical thought."1 This assumption has led Cullmann 
to call the words kairos and aion "concepts," even though not all of 
the occurrences of these words fit into the limitations of one partic_ 
ular concept. Barr demonstrates that, linguistically speaking, this is 
a bad habit. Barr further charges Cullmann with using Greek transliter-
ations in order to escape the burden of demonstrating that a particular 
occurrence of kairos or aion does fit into what Cullmann understands as 
the New Testament concept of time. 
John Marsh, in his The Maass of Time, advances two further crit-
icisms of Cullman. In the first place, Marsh maintains that, if the 
biblical time-line arises from the joining together of God's kairoi, 
as Oallmann claims, then this time is not really linear. Secondly, Marsh 
feels that it is impossible for Cullmann to affirm a real doctrine of 
the incarnation within the categories of his thinking about time.2 Our 
failure to treat these critiques in more detail has been a matter of 
selecting what was felt to be more important, not an attempt to ignore 
the stimulus of questions raised by these and other men. 
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Perhaps this paper, especially in its last two chapters has over-
emphasized some of the difficulties in which Cullman becomes involved 
when he permits the New Testament conception of time to influence and 
interpenetrate his approach to other New Testament questions. His approach 
has yielded not only problems for the theologian, but also many valuable 
and stimulating insights, in that it treats some areas of New Testament 
study from a new angle of vision. It is hoped that as the reader looks 
through these three windows into Cullmann's theological house he will 
see the stimulating insights as well as the puzzling problems. 
As for the problems, it must be admitted that the treatment of 
them in this paper has been at best tentative and probing, perhaps ex. 
cessively concise. It is hoped, however, that this paper indicates a 
trend in critiques of Cullmann, a trend away from the exegetical and 
toward the systematic, a trend that goes beyond the linguistic insights 
of a critic such as Barr to a study of the systematic presuppositions 
of both Callmaan and critics. 
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